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Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285 (2017)
Summer L. Carmack
One manner in which Indian tribes exercise their inherent
sovereignty is by asserting sovereign immunity. In Lewis v. Clarke, the
Court decided that the sovereign immunity extended to instrumentalities
of tribes did not further extend to tribal employees acting within the
scope of their employment. The Court acknowledged the concerns of the
lower court, namely, the possibility of setting a precedent allowing future
plaintiffs to sidestep a tribe’s sovereign immunity by suing a tribal
employee in his individual capacity. However, the Supreme Court
ultimately felt that the immunity of tribal employees should not exceed
the immunity extended to state and federal employees sued in their
individual capacity.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lewis v.
Clarke to resolve two issues: (1) whether the scope of tribal sovereign
immunity extends to protect a tribal employee from a negligence suit
resulting from acts committed within the scope of his employment; and
(2) whether a tribe’s indemnification policy in negligence suits against its
employees affects the Court’s immunity analysis.1 In an 8-0 decision, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 2
Analogizing the scope of tribal sovereign immunity to that enjoyed by
state and federal employees and entities, the Court decided that
extending immunity to tribal employees sued in their individual capacity
was beyond the purview of the tribe’s sovereign immunity. 3 The Court
also held that a tribal indemnity statute did not “convert the suit against
[the defendant] into a suit against the sovereign.”4 Therefore the statute
did nothing to alter the Court’s immunity analysis.5
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut has been a
federally recognized tribe since 1994. 6 In order to promote economic
development through gaming industries on the reservation, the tribe has
adhered to and complied with state and federal statutory and regulatory

1.
Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1289 (2017).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 1292.
4.
Id. at 1293.
5.
Id. at 1294.
6.
Id. at 1289-1290 (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 12,140 (1994); MOHEGAN
CONST., pmbl. and art. II).
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requirements.7 The Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority (“MTGA”), “an
arm of the Tribe,” 8 manages tribal gaming activities on behalf of the
tribe. 9 While the tribe had waived its immunity to be sued in the
Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court, “neither the Tribe nor the [MTGA]
ha[d] consented to suit for claims under Connecticut state law.” 10 In
addition, the Mohegan Tribal Code includes provisions that the MTGA
shall indemnify its employees in negligence suits, except where the
employee’s actions were deemed “wanton, reckless, or malicious.”11
William Clarke, the defendant, was driving a limousine as an
employee of the MTGA when he rear-ended the vehicle of the plaintiffs,
Brian and Michelle Lewis, on a state highway in Norwalk, Connecticut.12
Both parties stipulated that the defendant was negligently driving.13
The plaintiffs sued the defendant for negligence in Connecticut
state court.14 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that because he was acting within the scope
of his employment when the accident occurred, he was entitled to the
same immunity from suit extended to the MTGA.15 The trial court denied
the motion, reasoning that because the defendant was sued in his
individual capacity, and neither the MTGA nor the tribe were party to the
suit, it was irrelevant whether the defendant was acting within the scope
of his tribal employment when the incident occurred. 16 The defendant
argued that the tribe’s indemnification policies made the MTGA party to
the suit because they were ultimately responsible for remedies awarded
to the plaintiffs.17 In its rejection of this argument, the trial court stated
that a “voluntary undertaking cannot be used to extend sovereign
immunity where it did not otherwise exist.”18
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court
decision, holding that the defendant was entitled to the benefits of tribal

7.
Id. at 1290 (referring to the requirements of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2012), including entrance into a Gaming
Compact with the State of Connecticut, and the establishment of a Gaming Disputes
Court).
8.
Id.
9.
Id. (citing MOHEGAN CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Mohegan Tribe of
Indians Code § 2-21 (1995)).
10.
Id. (citing MOHEGAN CONST. art. IX, § 2(t); Mohegan Tribe of
Indians Code § 3-250(g) (amended 2014); Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (observing that Indian tribes have not surrendered their
immunity against suits by States)).
11.
Id. (quoting Mohegan Tribe of Indians Code § 4-52 (2007)).
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. (citing Lewis v. Clarke, No. KNLCV136019099S, 2014 WL
5354956, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Clarke III]).
15.
Id. (citing Clarke III, at *5).
16.
Id. at 1290-1291 (citing Clarke III, at *20).
17.
Id. at 1291 (citing Clarke III, at *7).
18.
Id. (quoting Clarke III, at *7).
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sovereign immunity.19 Connecticut’s supreme court viewed the suit as a
means for the plaintiffs to impermissibly “circumvent tribal immunity by
merely naming the defendant” in a suit concerning actions taken within
the scope of his employment. 20 The court found that this would
“‘eviscerate’ the protections of tribal immunity.”21 Since the court found
that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity on the first issue, it
did not address whether the tribe’s indemnification policy also entitled
the defendant to immunity.22
The United States Supreme Court later granted certiorari to
resolve whether the defendant was immune from suit as an employee of
the tribe, when his negligent acts were committed while working within
the scope of his employment.23
III.

ANALYSIS

After granting the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court was tasked with resolving whether tribal sovereign
immunity extended to tribal employees sued in their individual capacity,
and the role of a tribal indemnification policy in the Court’s sovereign
immunity analysis. The Court’s analysis is discussed below.
A. Sovereign Immunity in Individual-Capacity Suits
The Court looked to sovereign immunity suits involving state
and federal employees for guidance in determining whether the
sovereign immunity of the Mohegan Tribe extended to bar suits against
its individual employees for acts committed within the scope of their
employment. 24 In suits filed against federal or state employees, courts
first verify whether the employee or the sovereign is the “real party in
interest” to determine whether sovereign immunity applies.25 To do this,
courts discern “whether the remedy sought is truly against the
sovereign.”26
Here, the Court drew a distinction between official- and
individual- capacity claims. Official-capacity suits are in fact “against the
official’s office and thus the sovereign itself,” thereby triggering the
protections of sovereign immunity. 27 In individual-capacity suits, the

19.
Id.
20.
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Clarke, 135 A.3d 677, 683 (Conn. 2016)
[hereinafter Clarke II] (citations omitted)).
21.
Id. (quoting Clarke II, 135 A.3d at 684).
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 1292.
24.
Id. at 1291 (see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).
25.
Id.
26.
Id. (see, e.g., Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500-502 (1921)).
27.
Id. at 1292 (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 611 (1963)).
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official comes to court as an individual, and sovereign immunity is
therefore inapplicable.28 Determining the capacity in which the real party
in interest is being sued controls the immunity available to the party.29
The Court applied these general rules of sovereign immunity to
the tribal context, and determined that the suit was brought against the
defendant in his individual capacity.30 While the defendant was within
the scope of his employment when the incident occurred, he was on a
state highway, and the negligence action was “simply a suit against [the
defendant] to recover for his personal actions.”31
B. Role of a Tribal Indemnity Policy in Sovereign Immunity
Analysis
Whether a tribal indemnification policy would extend the tribe’s
sovereign immunity to an employee sued in his individual capacity was a
question of first impression for the United States Supreme Court.32 The
defendant argued that the MTGA “‘[was] the real party in interest’”
under the Court’s sovereign immunity analysis because the Mohegan
Tribal Code § 4-52 required the MTGA “to indemnify [the defendant]
for any adverse judgment.”33 The Court ultimately determined that “[t]he
critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse
judgment, not who will ultimately pick up the tab.”34
Plaintiffs brought the suit against the defendant in Connecticut
state court, and any judgment rendered there was unenforceable against
the tribe, who had not waived its immunity from suit.35 Although the
MTGA may ultimately pay remedies awarded against the defendant, the
Court determined that “[t]he Tribe’s indemnification provision does not
somehow convert the suit against Clarke into a suit against the
sovereign.” 36 The Court determined that the tribe’s indemnification

28.
Id. (quoting Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25; see also Hafer, 502 U.S. at 2731 (discharged employees entitled to bring person damages action against state
auditor general); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971)).
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 1293.
33.
Id. (emphasis in original).
34.
Id. at 1293-1294. The Court looked to Regents v. Univ. of
California for its analysis. 519 U.S. 425, 426 (1997). There, a state instrumentality
asserted the state’s sovereign immunity as a defense, although the federal
government had previously agreed to indemnify the state instrumentality. Here, the
Court said its earlier analysis in Regents had “turned on where the potential legal
liability lay, not from whence the money to pay the damages award ultimately
came.” Clarke, 137 S. Ct. at 1292.
35.
Id. at 1294.
36.
Id.
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statute did not alter its sovereign immunity analysis as to who was the
real party in interest.37
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decision in Lewis v. Clarke is significant because the United
States Supreme Court chose not to extend tribal sovereign immunity to
individual tribal employees acting within the scope of their employment.
Assertions of immunity are viewed as an important aspect of tribal
sovereignty. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut warned, it will be
important to monitor the effects of the Court’s decision.38 Ultimately the
result of this case may be the creation of a loophole, where claimants
may maneuver around tribal sovereign immunity.

37.
38.
2016)).

Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1291 (citing Clarke II, 135 A.3d 677, 683-684 (Conn.

